By Pavlos Andronikos
Nov.-Dec. 2002
[1]
PART 1
On
Monday 18 November after a three-hour-long meeting the National Council of
Cyprus agreed by a majority vote to accept the Annan Plan as a basis for
negotiations towards a settlement of the “Cyprus Problem”. The Turkish side’s
response was to ask for more time because the leader of the Turkish Cypriots
Rauf Denktash was recovering from heart surgery in New York,
and the Turkish government was still in transition after the recent elections.
Annan
has set a very tight deadline for resolving the Cyprus Problem. He wants an
agreement before the European Union summit on 12 December, when the leaders of
the European Union will meet in Copenhagen to decide on enlargement, including the accession of Cyprus
to the European Union. The Summit will also decide what to do about Turkey’s
membership aspirations, and Turkey is hoping that it will be given a date for the start of membership negotiations.
Clearly Annan is hoping that Turkey’s European Union aspirations will make it
more flexible over Cyprus, and, no doubt, he is also calculating that at this
delicate stage, the Greek Cypriots will not want to jeopardise their accession
to the European Union by turning down his proposals.
The
Turkish side is complaining loudly about the tight schedule, since it would
prefer the outcome of the European Union summit regarding its European future
not to be dependent on its response to the Annan Plan, which most Turkish
commentators seem to regard as not favourable enough to their side. However
Turkish intransigence on Cyprus
would give the European Union one more excuse, if it needs any more, to leave Turkey
knocking at the door.
The
Annan Plan can be read in English or Greek at the Cyprus News Agency web site at
http://www.cna.org.cy/. It is a long document, containing much that is
controversial. I intend over the next few weeks to express some personal views
on the Plan, which, on a first reading, seems to contain a lot of concessions to
Turkish intransigence, and little that will gladden the hearts of Greek
Cypriots.
A Turkish Victory
In
many respects, my view of the Plan is the same as that of the journalist Mehmet
Ali Birand, who recently published a column in the Turkish Daily News with the
title “In Cyprus Turks Have Won”.
Commenting on the Annan Plan he wrote that “the
“In 1974 the Greek Cypriots had ‘lost’ on a de facto basis. Now, these losses are being put down on record legally. Denktash’s dreams have been fulfilled….. We should be crying out, celebrating the victory, rather than wailing.”
It
follows from what he says that the Greek Cypriots, the majority indigenous
population of
The Best…
Ironically, the most positive provision of the Annan Plan is Article 35, which
provides for the possibility of amendments to the proposed constitution. This is
an improvement on the 1960 constitution, which was foisted on
To be
accepted, amendments to the constitution would have to be approved by a separate
majority in a referendum in each component state. However the need for a
separate majority means that 50% plus one of the Turkish Cypriots—at most a mere
10% of the total population of
… and the Worst
The
worst aspect of the Annan Plan is its frequent insistence on political equality
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. For example, the preamble to the
Foundation Agreement requires that the two sides acknowledge that their
relationship “is not one of majority and minority but of political equality”.
This is pure Denktash-speak, and is indicative of just how much the Annan Plan
represents an attempt to appease Denktash. In Denktash’s
ultra-Turkish-nationalist mindset, Turks, the former rulers of
Majorities & Minorities
The
Greek Cypriots are at least 80% of the legitimate population of
Whatever the precise figures, what is certain is that a minority is a minority
is a minority! It makes a nonsense of all principles of justice and fairness to
allow a minority to impose partition by force on the majority population of a
country and then expect that majority to endorse this fait accompli with its
signature. To further expect that majority to sign away its rights as a majority
and grant political equality to the minority is totally absurd, yet that is
exactly what the Greek Cypriots seem to be expected to do by Mr Annan. The fact
that just about every commentator seems to be blind to the absurdity of such a
plan is testimony to the power of the forces that are aligned against the Greek
Cypriots and the extent to which these forces control the debate about
One
would have hoped that the Secretary General of the UNO could have come up with a
plan for
PS: It
should come as no surprise that, according to the US State Department Special
Co-ordinator for
PART 2
The
Annan Plan begins with a short document called “Comprehensive Settlement of the
Cyprus Problem”, which is made up of four articles relating to five Appendices:
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement
Appendix B: Measures to accompany and facilitate the finalisation process
Appendix C: Treaty between
Appendix D: Matters to be submitted to the United Nations Security Council for
decision
Appendix E: Requests to the European Union with respect to the accession of
The
Appendices contain not just a series of numbered articles but also Attachments
and draft Annexes, which can be quite substantial. For example, the whole of the
Constitution is a draft Annex to the Foundation Agreement, which is itself a
draft Annex to Appendix C!
Signatories to the “Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” would be
Clerides “for the Greek Cypriot side” and Denktash “for the Turkish Cypriot
side”, and in signing they would be accepting, amongst other things, the “main
articles” of the Foundation Agreement (Articles 1-13), and a specific boundary
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot “component states”.
The
Finalisation Process
Following the agreement of all parties to the Comprehensive Settlement, which is
supposed to take place by
The
Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators would have to finalise all of the draft
Annexes by
The
percentage of the vote that would be required for acceptance of the Agreement is
not stated. My view is that for something as important as this it ought to be at
least 67%. (In the 1960 constitution, non-basic articles could only be amended
by separate majorities of two thirds. This agreement constitutes an “amendment”
of all the articles of the 1960 constitution, basic or otherwise.)
One
wonders whether Turkish settlers in the occupied territory would be able to vote
in the referendum. It would be scandalous indeed to have the future of
There
is a sly catch built into the process envisaged by the Annan Plan. The referenda
would tie approval of the Foundation Agreement to the accession of
In
fact given the timing proposed by the Annan Plan and the way it incorporates
accession to the European Union, it almost seems as if the Plan is a last ditch
attempt to tie Cyprus’ accession to the European Union to a settlement with
(read “capitulation to”) the Turkish Cypriots. When one considers that the Greek
Cypriots have precious few cards to play in their negotiations with the Turkish
Cypriots and that membership of the European Union would finally give them not
the upper hand but a better hand, the hasty moves by the United Nations
Secretary General to forestall a situation where the Greek Cypriots would be
able to take a tougher stand in support of legitimate rights seem downright
mean-spirited.
Treaties Galore!
If
either one of the referenda fails to endorse the Foundation Agreement, the whole
package would automatically become null and void. Otherwise, the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots, along with
More
or less the whole package proposed by Annan is contained in Appendix C, which,
when finalised, would include the Foundation Agreement and Constitution, as well
as articles reaffirming the 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee.
With
regard to the latter, once again Turkey would have the right to take action
unilaterally in Cyprus (read “invade”) in order to restore the constitution
(read “impose a new order by force”), just as she did in 1974!
Personally, I can see no reason why
The
British Bases & Demilitarisation
The
Annan Plan is silent on the issue of the British military bases but given that
the Treaty of Establishment is reaffirmed in the Foundation Agreement itself,
where it is stated that it will apply mutatis mutandis (i.e., with due
alteration of details), it would seem that the United Kingdom will continue to
retain sovereignty over 99 square miles of Cyprus as well as fairly extensive
rights outside of the bases where these are deemed necessary for the effective
use of the bases.
The
continued existence of the bases, and the provision for contingents of Greek and
Turkish troops on the island envisaged by the Treaty of Alliance do not sit well
with the demilitarisation of
The
same article goes on to state that its provisions are “without prejudice to the
provisions of the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty
of Alliance”!
Presumably this means that if Britain wanted to allow its military bases to be
used for international military operations it could do so, regardless of the
views of the Cypriots, Greece or Turkey, whereas the Cypriots would not have a
similar freedom of action.
It
would be better to completely demilitarise
As for
the British bases, even if it was deemed by the government of
The point from where this picture was taken (Dherynia in 1998) was about as close as Greek Cypriots could get to Varosi (the modern part of Famagusta). When Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and her troops marched on Famagusta, the Greek Cypriots of the city fled to safety. They have never been allowed to return, but nor has Turkey dared defy international opinion and introduce settlers into the city, consequently it has become a ghost town—a testament to the bloody-mindedness of the leaders of the occupying forces. The last time I set foot in Famagusta, in 1972, it was a bustling harbour town and Cyprus’ premier seaside tourist resort.
PART 3
Settlers
The
number of Turkish Cypriots in
Last
September, in his preliminary report on the “colonisation by Turkish settlers of
the occupied part of Cyprus” to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, the Finnish rapporteur Jaakko Laakso noted that “although Greek Cypriots
constituted over 78% of the total population in 1973, and 77% in 1992, they now
stand for 76%, due to the inflow of Turkish settlers”. According to Laakso this
“creates a real threat that in the long-term the considerable increase in the
numbers of the Turkish-speaking population might be used for a justification of
the inordinate claims of the Turkish side regarding territorial arrangements and
political powers in a final settlement of the
Despite the seriousness of the issue, the Annan Plan has nothing at all to say
about settlers! What the Plan does offer is a set of measures that, in
combination, would probably grant most of the settlers Cypriot citizenship. This
is entirely unacceptable.
If the
Annan Plan comes into force, the following will be considered citizens of
Any
person who held Cypriot citizenship in 1960 and his or her descendants;
Any
18 year old person who was born in
Any
person who is married to a Cypriot citizen and has permanently resided for at
least two years in
Minor children of the persons in the above categories who are permanently
residing in Cyprus.[5]
As a
result of “b” and “c”, some of the children of Turkish settlers and any settlers
married to Turkish Cypriots will be granted Cypriot citizenship.
The
remaining settlers could gain Cypriot citizenship through a special measure
which allows for “persons whose names figure on a list agreed by the parties to
the Comprehensive Settlement” to be considered citizens of
Any
settlers not covered by the above provisions could acquire citizenship by
naturalisation, since any foreigner over 18 who has legally resided in Cyprus
for at least seven consecutive years may apply for Cypriot citizenship.[7] The
word “legally” should exclude settlers from this provision, but, since the Annan
Plan implicitly recognises the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot administration,
I doubt that the requirement for legal residence will prove an obstacle to the
naturalisation of settlers.
It
should also be borne in mind that
Property Rights
Property in Areas Subject to Territorial Adjustment
Owners
of property in areas that are to be given back to the Greek Cypriots will be
entitled to reinstatement of their property. However they will have to wait for
the Property Board to determine that the property is “eligible for
reinstatement”, and reinstatement will take place only when the current user has
been “relocated”. Reinstatement will be “no later than three years after entry
into force of the Foundation Agreement”.[9]
Alternatively, owners can claim “compensation” from the Property Board at
“current value” in exchange for the title to their property.[10]
“Current value” means the value of the property at the time of dispossession,
“plus an adjustment to reflect appreciation based among other things on increase
in average sale prices of properties in
Property in the
Only
some of the Greek Cypriots who own property in the Turkish Cypriot component
state will have their property “reinstated”, the rest will be compensated at
“current value”.
Claimants will have to wait at least three years after the Foundation Agreement
enters into force for their property to be reinstated if it is vacant, and at
least five years if it is occupied.
The
percentage of property that will be reinstated will be limited to a figure yet
to be agreed, and eligible claimants will be “awarded reinstatement based on
priority in descending order of age, until the agreed levels are reached”.[12]
Property will not be reinstated if it is “required for military purposes”, if it
has been “significantly improved”, if it is being used for “public benefit
purposes”, or if it is being used by “dispossessed owners” or “subsequent
purchasers from dispossessed owners”.[13]
Notice
that reinstatement is seen not as a right, which it undoubtedly is, but as an
“award”.
The
Return of Refugees
Given
the decision to allow the Turkish Cypriots to keep approximately 28% of Cyprus
(even though they now account for only 11.6% of the legitimate population)[14],
the proposed border between the two component states has been drawn in such a
way as to allow as many Greek Cypriots as “possible” to return to their homes
and villages (in theory). However, the great majority of refugees will find that
their homes are in the Turkish Cypriot component state, and that only a fraction
of them will be allowed to return.
For
these latter refugees, the Annan Plan envisages a very slow rate of return
spread over 20 years, and only up to a limit of one third of the population of
the Turkish Cypriot component state. Thus in the first year only 1% would be
allowed to return, then 4% by the fourth year, 7% by the seventh year, etc.
These percentage limits would also apply at municipality and village level (with
some exceptions).[15]
Priority will be given to those “to whom properties have been reinstated by
order of the Property Board, and their families; second to other persons who
were inhabitants of the relevant municipality or village before 1963 or 1974
respectively, and their families; and third to the heirs of either category of
persons.”[16]
Each
component state would have the right to limit the exercise of political rights
at state level to those holding its citizenship, and residence in the component
state would not automatically bestow political rights in that state.[17]
However any Cypriot citizen “who has been resident in a component state for any
seven consecutive years shall be entitled to apply for the internal component
state citizenship status of that component state”.[18]
This
last provision is not clarified. Would the authorities be obliged to grant
citizenship status? Under what circumstances could they refuse it?
Compensation for Loss of Use of Property
In May
2001 the European Court of Human Rights judged in the case of
These
judgements were made because Turkey refuses “to allow the return of any
Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to their homes in northern Cyprus”; because
“Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus were being denied
access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as any
compensation for the interference with their property rights”; and because
Turkey was not providing Greek-Cypriot displaced persons “any remedies to
contest interferences with their rights”.[19]
Also,
in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights found that
“denial of access to property in northern Cyprus was imputable to Turkey”, and
ordered Turkey to pay compensation of 320,000 Cyprus pounds to Titina Loizidou
for the loss of use of her property.[20]
With
these two judgements,
So
much for property rights!
But
the issue is not just about property and financial compensation. The decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights point in one direction only. All displaced
Cypriots have the right to return to their homes. The Annan Plan wants to take
that right from them.
Pavlos
Andronikos
A
version of this set of three articles on the Annan Plan appeared in Neos Kosmos
English Weekly (Melbourne) 25 Nov., 2 &
When one thinks about it, the Annan Plan could be seen as an effort to change
the constitution of
“PACE Report Finds Turkish Colonisation Alters
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex III: Common state Legislation upon
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement: Attachment 4: Law on Cypriot
citizenship: Article 3.1
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex III: Common state Legislation upon
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement: Attachment 4: Law on Cypriot
citizenship: Article 3.2
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex III: Common state Legislation upon
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement: Attachment 4: Law on Cypriot
citizenship: Article 5
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex III: Common State Legislation upon
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement: Attachment 5: Law on aliens,
immigration and asylum: Article 2
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Attachment 4: Property located in areas subject
to territorial adjustment: Article 2.2
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Attachment 4: Property located in areas subject
to territorial adjustment: Article 4
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Attachment 1: Definitions: Article 1.3 & Footnote
22
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Articles 8, 16, 17
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Articles 10-14
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex II: Constitutional Laws:
Attachment 3: Constitutional Law on internal component state citizenship status:
Articles 6 & 7.1.
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex II: Constitutional Laws:
Attachment 3: Constitutional Law on internal component state citizenship status:
Article 7.2.
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex II: Constitutional Laws:
Attachment 3: Constitutional Law on internal component state citizenship status:
Article 3.
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex II: Constitutional Laws:
Attachment 3: Constitutional Law on internal component state citizenship status:
Article 2.2
See “Judgement in the Case if
See Judgement: Case of Loizidou v.
Appendix A: Foundation Agreement: Draft Annex VII: Treatment of Property
affected by Events since 1963: Article 21 & 5.2
© Pavlos Andronikos.
All Rights Reserved.